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Atlantic Richfield Company v. Christian, 140 S. Ct. 1335 (2020) 
 
Jo J. Phippin 
 
In 1983, the EPA designated roughly 300 miles of polluted mining 
land near Butte, Montana, as a Superfund site, which the EPA now 
manages. In 2008, landowners adjacent to the Superfund site brought state 
law claims against Atlantic Richfield, the company that owned the smelter 
site. In March 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that 
Montana state courts have jurisdiction over the landowners’ suit, and that 
the landowners on this Superfund site qualify as potentially responsible 
parties. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In Atlantic Richfield Company v. Christian,1 the plaintiffs 
(“landowners”) sought restoration damages from the company that owned 
the smelter site, the Atlantic Richfield Company (“Atlantic Richfield”), 
for trespass, nuisance, and strict liability under Montana state law. Atlantic 
Richfield asserted that Montana state courts lacked jurisdiction over the 
landowners’ claims, and that the landowners were potentially responsible 
parties. The Supreme Court of the United States (“the Supreme Court” or 
“the Court”) considered two issues. First, whether the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) 
strips Montana state courts of jurisdiction over a suit for restoration 
damages on a Superfund site.2 Second, the Court considered whether the 
landowners qualify as potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”) under 
CERCLA, thereby requiring them to receive approval from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) before initiating individual 
remedial efforts on their properties.3 The landowners argued that Montana 
state courts possessed jurisdiction, and that they did not qualify as PRPs; 
Atlantic Richfield argued the opposite.4 The Supreme Court held that 
CERCLA does not strip Montana state courts of jurisdiction over this suit.5 
Additionally, the Court held that the landowners qualify as PRPs.6 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 1902, an abundance of copper catalyzed a prosperous mining 
industry in Butte, Montana.7 Subsequently, the Anaconda Copper Mining 
Company constructed three smelters to refine copper in the nearby town 
 
1. 140 S. Ct. 1335 (2020). 
2. Id. at 1345. 
3.  Id. 
4. Id. at 1348, 1350, 1352, 1354. 
5. Id. at 1349. 
6. Id. at 1352. 
7.  Id. at 1346, 1361. 
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of Anaconda.8 In the 1970s, the price of copper began dropping 
prompting Atlantic Richfield to purchase the Anaconda Company; 
however, by 1980 Atlantic Richfield shut down the smelters because the 
copper’s value plummeted.9 Also in 1980, Congress passed CERCLA, 
which made Atlantic Richfield liable for the tons of arsenic and lead that 
the smelters emitted during the previous century across the Deer Lodge 
Valley.10 The EPA declared over 300 square miles surrounding the 
smelters as a Superfund site.11 Accordingly, the EPA created a cleanup 
plan and still works with Atlantic Richfield to carry out those remedial 
efforts.12 
In 2008, ninety-eight landowners with property contaminated by 
the Superfund site brought a suit against Atlantic Richfield in Montana 
state court, claiming trespass, nuisance, and strict liability for restoration 
damages.13 The landowners sought to use the damages to implement their 
own remedial efforts on their respective properties.14 However, the 
landowners’ desired plan exceeded the ceiling set by the EPA as 
“protective of human health and the environment.”15 For instance, while 
the EPA’s plan called for the maximum soil contamination level to be no 
higher than 250 parts per million of arsenic, the landowners want to 
reduce that number to 15 parts per million of arsenic.16 
In the district court, the landowners and Atlantic Richfield filed 
competing motions for summary judgment on whether CERCLA 
precluded the claim for restoration damages brought by the landowners.17 
Atlantic Richfield argued that CERCLA, via Section 113(h), preempted 
the landowners’ claim by stripping Montana state courts jurisdiction.18 
The district court did not address the preemption issue; it dismissed the 
landowners’ case based on Atlantic Richfield’s argument that the statute 
of limitations barred their claims.19  
The landowners appealed, and the Montana Supreme Court 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case back to the 
district court.20 On remand, the district court denied Atlantic Richfield’s 
motions for summary judgment.21 Subsequently, Atlantic Richfield 
petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory 
 
8.  Id. at 1346. 
9.  Id. at 1345, 1347. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. 
12.  Id. 
13.  Id. 
14.  Id. at 1348. 
15.  Id. at 1347–48. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. at 1348. 
18. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Mont. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 2017 
MT 324, ¶ 12–13, 390 Mont. 76, 408 P.3d 515 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) 
(2018)). 
19.  Id. at ¶ 5. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
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control.22 The Montana Supreme Court granted the writ and held that 
Montana courts possessed jurisdiction over the landowners’ claim for 
restoration damages, and that the landowners did not qualify as PRPs.23 
Then, Atlantic Richfield filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the 
Supreme Court granted.24 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Supreme Court ruled on two issues concerning jurisdiction 
in this case.25 First, the Court considered whether it possessed 
jurisdiction to review the Montana Supreme Court’s decision.26 Second, 
the Court considered whether Montana state courts possessed jurisdiction 
over the landowners’ claim for restoration damages.27 Then, the Court 
determined whether it considers the landowners as PRPs. 
 
A.  Jurisdiction 
 
The Court held that it possessed jurisdiction to review the 
Montana Supreme Court’s decision.28 The Court stated it had jurisdiction 
to review “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a 
State.”29 The Court dismissed the landowners’ argument that the 
Montana Supreme Court’s judgment was not fully decided because the 
Court remanded to the lower court for trial.30 The Court reasoned that 
because the Montana Supreme Court heard the case based on a writ of 
supervisory control, it was not an interlocutory or intermediate 
litigation.31 Rather, the Court stated the writ of supervisory control 
constituted a “self-contained” or “separate” lawsuit that resulted in a 
final judgment.32 
Next, the Court affirmed that Montana courts had jurisdiction 
over the landowners’ suit for restoration damages.33 Atlantic Richfield 
argued that Section 113(h) of CERCLA expands the type of actions that 
are precluded from state court jurisdiction under Section 113(b) of 
CERCLA.34 Section 113(b) strips state courts of jurisdiction over cases 
“arising under” CERCLA, while Section 113(h) strips federal courts of 
jurisdiction over some “challenges” to remedial actions on Superfund 
 
22. Id. 
23.  Atlantic Richfield Co., 140 S. Ct. at 1349. 
24. Id. 




29. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2018)). 
30. Id. 
31.  Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 1349, 1357. 
34. Id. at 1349 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b), (h) (2018)). 
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sites.35 The Court rejected Atlantic Richfield’s argument because a plain 
reading of the text rendered it “insurmountable.”36 The Court stated that 
Section 113(h) and 113(b) work independently of one another, and only 
overlap when a suit meets three criteria: (1) it challenges a cleanup plan; 
(2) it is brought in federal court; and (3) it arises under CERCLA.37 
Because the landowners claimed nuisance, trespass, and strict liability, 
their suits arose under Montana law, not CERCLA, which governs 
federal laws.38 Therefore, the Court held that Montana courts have 
jurisdiction over this suit because it arose under state law claims.39 
 
B.  The Landowners Qualify as PRPs 
 
Next, the Court discussed the landowners’ status as PRPs. As the 
Court noted, determining whether a party is a PRP is important because 
this status regulates whether a party needs EPA approval before 
undertaking remedial efforts on private property.40 Section 122(e)(6) states 
that “[w]hen either the President, or a potentially responsible party . . . has 
initiated a remedial investigation and feasibility study for a particular 
facility under this chapter, no potentially responsible party may undertake 
any remedial action at the facility unless such remedial action has been 
authorized by the President.”41 Both Atlantic Richfield and the landowners 
agree that this section requires any PRP to get approval from the EPA 
before taking remedial action.42 In order to determine if the landowners 
are PRPs, the Court looked to the list of “covered persons” in Section 107 
of CERCLA.43 Section 107(a) states that any “owner” of “a facility” is a 
PRP, and that a facility is “any site or area where a hazardous substance 
has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to 
be located.”44 Therefore, the Court held that the landowners are PRPs 
because arsenic and lead are hazardous substances and are located on their 
properties.45 
The landowners put forth two arguments denying PRP status that 
the Court rejected. The landowners argued that they do not qualify as PRPs 
because CERCLA’s “six-year limitations period for recovery of remedial 
costs has run, and thus they could not be held liable in a hypothetical 
lawsuit.”46 In addition, the landowners argued that they do not qualify as 
PRPs “because they did not receive the notice of settlement negotiations 
 
35. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b), (h)). 
36. Id. at 1349. 
37. Id. 1350, 1352 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b), (h)). 
38. Id. at 1350. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6) (2018)). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2018)). 
44. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B) (2018)). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B) (2018)). 
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required by Section 122(e)(1).”47 The Court rejected the landowners’ first 
argument because a landowner can be a PRP even when that landowner 
can no longer be sued.48 Additionally, the Court drew on the policy goals 
behind CERCLA. The Court stated that PRPs include owners of 
contaminated property, even “innocent landowner[s]” because 
CERCLA’s goal, as its name suggests, is to develop a “Comprehensive 
Environmental Response” to pollution.49 The Court pointed out that if the 
landowners’ first argument prevailed, there would likely be tens of 
thousands of competing cleanup plans headed by individual landowners 
rather than one comprehensive plan managed by the EPA.50  
Next, the Court rejected the landowners’ second argument. Under 
Section 122(e)(1) of CERCLA, all PRPs must be notified of settlement 
negotiations.51 The EPA has a nonenforcement policy, which provides that 
the EPA does not seek recovery costs from landowners who did not cause 
the contamination affecting their property, and who do not interfere with 
the EPA’s cleanup efforts.52 Under this nonenforcement policy, the EPA 
did not include the ninety-eight landowners in settlement negotiations; 
thus, the landowners argued that they could not qualify for PRP status.53 
The Court stated that although the EPA did not follow CERCLA’s 
mandate when it failed to provide the landowners with notice of settlement 
negotiations, the landowners are nevertheless considered PRPs.54  
Alternatively, the landowners argued that if they do qualify as 
PRPS, they qualify as contiguous property owners under Section 107(g) 
and shed their PRP status.55 The Court rejected this “last ditch effort” 
argument.56 The majority reasoned that eight requirements must be met for 
a landowner to qualify as a contiguous property owner under CERCLA; a 
“high bar” that not all ninety-eight individual landowners could clear.57  In 
particular, the eighth requirement is that a person “did not know or have 
reason to know that the property was or could be contaminated by a release 
or threatened release of one or more hazardous substances.”58 The Court 
stated that there was abundant evidence of public knowledge both arsenic 
and lead contaminated.59 As an example of public knowledge, the Court 
pointed out that all ninety-eight landowners purchased their respective 
 
47. Id. at 1354 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(1) (2018)). 
48. Id. at 1352. 
49. Id. at 1353 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (2018)). 
50. Id. 




55. Id. at 1356 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(g) (2018)). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)(1)(A)(i)-(viii) (2018)). 
58. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)(1)(A)(viii)(II) (2018)). 
59.  Id. (citing Christian v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 368 P.3d 131, 155 
(2015)). 
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properties after the Anaconda Company constructed “Washington 
Monument sized smelter”.60  
Also, the Court again drew on CERCLA’s underlying policy 
goals; even if the individual landowners met all eight requirements, 
CERCLA demands that contiguous landowners provide “full cooperation, 
assistance, and access” to the EPA’s Superfund cleanup efforts.61 The 
Federal Government’s interpretation of the landowners’ proposed plan for 
remedial action demonstrates that individual efforts conflict and interfere 
with the EPA’s efforts.62 Thus, the landowners would lose their status as 
contiguous owners regardless.63 Overall, the Court held that the 
landowners need EPA approval before taking remedial action because they 
are PRPs under CERCLA; thus, the Court held that the Montana Supreme 
Court erred in this part of their holding.64 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian highlights a rift created by 
CERCLA. The benefits of a comprehensive environmental cleanup of 
hazardous pollutants result in obstacles for property owners on Superfund 
sites who wish to take individual remedial efforts.65 In the dissent, Justice 
Gorsuch contends that the Court’s interpretation of CERCLA, whereby 
landowners must receive EPA approval before taking remedial action on 
private property, is “paternalistic central planning,” and “turns a cold 
shoulder to ‘state law efforts to restore state lands.’”66 Alternatively, the 
majority describes this as the “spirit of cooperative federalism [that] run[s] 
throughout CERCLA and its regulations.”67 Perhaps to account for this 
rift, the Court urged that if the landowners pursued approval from the EPA 
for their plan, the clash between the EPA and the landowners could be 




62.  Id. at 1353. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 1352. 
65. Id. at 1347–48. 
66. Id. at 1356. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1355, 1357. 
